Below is my recap & post-mortem on the Giuliani candidacy. It is completely from memory (except for double-checking timing of poll numbers), so I may be forgetting some facts (which I assume others will add). Forgive the slight formatting problem with the bullets.

1. Initially (late 2006, January 2007), his name recognition, popular image (from 9/11, “America’s Mayor”), and use of 9/11 to position himself as strong on national security, combined with ignorance on his past positions on social issues, put him about tied with McCain for the lead in national polls
2. Feb, 2007: Rudy announces (in effect), combined with a ton of big media interviews in which he respositions himself substantially to the right of Old Rudy on social issues (see bullet points below), thereby maintaining viability rather than being rejected up-front due to those Old Rudy positions. He does this despite his effort to sell his “authenticity” and the obvious risk/cost to that effort of shifting positions in a politically convenient direction, because he knows the new positions are necessary to mitigate the social issue disadvantage sufficiently to satisfice many social conservatives and to enable prominent conservative voices (e.g., Rush Limbaugh, Republican politicians, etc.) to speak highly of him in general (e.g., on war on terror) and to reassure their audiences that Rudy would be ok on social issues (particularly on judges/justices, which they emphasized was what mattered most). This reassuring message, combined with this support from prominent conservatives and Rudy’s focus on national security and “leadership” results in a large, sharp rise in Rudy’s poll numbers, enabling him to raise very substantial campaign funds (which themselves were reported and showed strength) – all with a synergistic and reinforcing effect.

·        Abortion

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  • Previously supported partial birth abortion. Now opposes.
  • Previously supported public funding of abortion. Now opposes.
  • Previously opposed requiring even parental notification (let alone consent) for minors, even with judicial bypass. Now supports it with judicial bypass.
  • MOST IMPORTANTLY, previously agreed that “Roe was good constitutional law”. Now emphasizes commitment to “strict constructionists” (No strict constructionist would even think for a fraction of a second that Roe may have been “good constitutional law”. It’s perhaps the greatest example of the opposite of strict constructionism.) Also previously indicated that Ruth Bader Ginsburg would have fit the his key criterion (Ginsburg is perhaps the antithesis of a strict constructionist).

·        Essential message of all of the above: “I still believe a woman should be able to choose to have an abortion, but as president I’ll be effectively pro-life. I’ll do almost exactly the same thing on policy and judges as any pro-life candidate.”

·        Guns

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  • Previously strongly advocated very strong FEDERAL gun control. Now says gun control should be left to the states.

·        Gays: (I vaguely recall a shift rightward to some degree on gay rights, but I don’t remember the specifics)

1. Later in 2007: Knowing/discovering that despite his shift to the right on social issues, he wouldn’t have a  chance in Iowa as long as he was still saying he believed that ultimately a woman should have the choice to have an abortion (i.e, not pulling a complete Romney-esque 180 in his rhetoric), and since at this point most voters were probably aware that he was nominally “pro-choice” and perhaps aware of his past positions, he focused on New Hampshire instead, although he did compete in Iowa debate(s).
2. Rudy tries hard in NH, but doesn’t get traction. He decides to focus on FL. Campaign contributions probably start to dry up at this point.
3. Rudy does very poorly in IA, NH, MI and SC (as well as NV and WY, which didn’t get much attention anyway). Although Rudy participates in debates in December and January, he largely out of the media spotlight, which, combined with the poor showings and McCain’s successes, cause Rudy’s poll numbers to decline nationally and even in FL. He also (apparently) starts to run low on cash, producing a synergistic negative effect.

Bottom Line:

·        Rudy shifted substantially rightward on social issues to have a chance at the nomination, but he remained nominally “pro-choice” even as he promised an agenda (policies and judicial appointments) that would be effectively pro-life.

·        Due to his nominally being “pro-choice”, Rudy was unable to be competitive in Iowa, NH and SC despite his position shifts.

·        Given the above and faced with the strategic choice of (1) continuing to devote substantial energy and resources (human and financial) to these early states only to place a stronger third (or so) rather than a weaker third (or fourth or fifth), or (2) focus on FL as a springboard to Super Tuesday (with winner-take-all delegates in NY and NJ where Rudy had his best chances of winning), Rudy opted for the latter.

·        His strategic choice may or may not have doomed him, but the bottom-bottom-line is that his being nominally “pro-choice”, combined with suspicion of his commitment to "strict constructionist" judges and gun rights (and probably to some extent dislike of his support of civil unions), ultimately forced him to choose between two bad options.